

CONSTRAINTS AND PREFERENCES IN
INDUCTIVE LEARNING: AN EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY OF HUMAN AND MACHINE PERFORMANCE

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Constraints and Preferences in Inductive Learning: An Experimental Study of Human and Machine Performance

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The paper examines constraints and preferences employed by people in learning decision rules from preclassified examples. Results from four experiments with human subjects were analyzed and compared with artificial intelligence (AI) inductive learning programs. The results showed the people's rule inductions tended to emphasize category validity (probability of some property, given a category) more than cue validity (probability that an entity is a member of a category given that it has some property) to a greater extent than did the AI programs. Although the relative proportions of different rule types (e.g., conjunctive vs. disjunctive) changed across experiments, a single process model provided a good account of the data from each study. These observations are used to argue for describing constraints in terms of processes embodied in models rather than in terms of products or outputs. Thus AI induction programs become candidate psychological process models and results from inductive learning experiments can suggest new algorithms. More generally, the results show that human inductive generalizations tend toward greater specificity than would be expected if conceptual simplicity were the key constraint on inductions. This bias toward specificity may be due to the fact that this criterion both maximizes inferences that may be drawn from category membership and protects rule induction systems from developing over-generalizations.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Probably the most impressive fact about inductive learning is not that it occurs naturally in intelligent systems, but rather that it does not get out of hand. Any limited set of experiences will be consistent with an unlimited set of possible inductive generalizations. To give but one example, the next item in the sequence 1,2,4 might justifiably be 5 (increasing integers not divisible by 3), 8 (as in the equation $a_{n+1} = 2a_n$, $a_1 = 1$), 14 (as in $a_{n+1} = a_n^2 - a_n + 2$, $a_1 = 1$), A (as in 1,2,4,A,B,D) or really anything. Therefore, a major issue concerns which of these possible inductive generalizations are generated or preferred by people. This issue has become particularly salient with the advent of computer programs capable of inductive learning (e.g., see Michalski, Carbonell, & Mitchell, 1983, 1986, for recent reviews). Aside from the general issue of how to form useful inductive generalizations, an important research topic for studies of human-computer interaction is the extent to which humans and computer programs form compatible inductive generalizations. If there are general correspondences then each potentially can be used to inform the other.

This paper is concerned with rule induction from preclassified examples. The search for constraints associated with rule induction raises the question of how we select among the large set of potential rules that can describe any particular classification or partitioning. Presumably only some of the possible rules are natural for human beings.

Why Look for Constraints?

Our explicit assumption is that some rule inductions associated with partitions of entities are natural and others are awkward or unnatural. One possibility is that naturalness is strongly context-dependent: that is, it varies with the specific contents of the entities under consideration. On that view, it simply is not possible to develop formal, universal constraints on rule induction, or the constraints might have to be stated at a level too general to be useful. A more optimistic attitude is that fairly universal constraints or biases on human rule inductions exist and that they might provide important general principles for the question of how intelligent systems structure their experience.

A more specific reason for seeking constraints on inductive generalizations concerns the compatibility between human and computer inductive learning. Inductive learning programs in artificial intelligence (AI) can be thought of as "expert systems" that can suggest new meaningful groupings of observations or generate descriptions of given classes of observations. If these new groupings or descriptions are to be useful, they must be understood and, therefore, it is helpful if the groupings are described in a way that is compatible with human biases or descriptive preferences (for an example involving practical results from automated induction of descrip-

tions of soybean diseases, see Michalski & Chilausky, 1980). Conversely, constraints derived from human data provide candidate principles for AI programs. Although the present studies are exploratory, they are motivated in part by principles derived from both AI and cognitive psychology. The next section describes some of these principles.

II. CONSTRAINTS IN INDUCTIVE LEARNING

Cognitive psychologists have generated a large body of data on classification learning from examples and on the difficulty of learning different types of rules. In rule learning experiments, the experimenter creates a stimulus partitioning that conforms to some prespecified rule and the data of interest concern the speed with which subjects converge on that rule. There has not been a concomitant interest in the situation where a partitioning admits of many possible rules and the major issue is what forms and types of rules typically are developed from experience. Nonetheless, if there is a close link between ease of learning and naturalness, then one may be able to use results on learning difficulty to generate candidate biases in rule induction. Several factors that seem to influence the inductive learning process are considered below:

1. Preference for Simple Rules

It is true almost by definition that simple rules are easier to learn than complex ones. In fact the notion of simplicity and parsimony is so well engrained in the scientific community that one might wonder if any other constraints are needed. Simplicity, however, is a very elusive concept and some have questioned whether it can be meaningful at all, since simplicity depends on the particular language of description employed (see Goodman, 1972).

Informally speaking, simplicity is the inverse of conceptual complexity, where complexity reflects the time expended and resource costs, i.e., "mental effort," needed to use the rule in decision making. One problem with this definition is that, for the same task, mental effort may differ with practice, background knowledge, and other contextual factors. If simplicity is defined only in terms of mental effort and cannot be specified in advance, then it becomes a dependent rather than an independent variable. For simplicity to provide a meaningful constraint on inductive learning it must be operationally defined.

In one attempt to be specific about simplicity, Neisser and Weene (1962) posited some basic logical operations (i.e., conjunction, disjunction, negation) and defined simplicity in terms of the number of operations needed to describe a partitioning. They also found that ease of learning was directly related to simplicity so defined. To the extent that one can specify which operations are basic, one can test the idea that simplicity provides a useful

constraint on rule induction (see also Pinker, 1979). Because simplicity can change with the language of descriptions employed, it is important to evaluate simplicity within a theoretical framework that specifies basic operations and elementary concepts.

2. Preference for Conjunctive Rather than Disjunctive Rules

Rosch and her associates have persuasively argued that real-world categories are formed to exploit clusters of correlated attributes (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1975, 1978). For example, animals with feathers are very likely to have wings and beaks, whereas animals with fur are very unlikely to have wings and beaks. In other words, correlated attributes carry information that permits one to go from knowledge of some attributes to predictions about others. An organism sensitive to these correlated or co-occurring attributes might find conjunctive concepts or rules more natural than disjunctive concepts or rules. Another important advantage is that conjunctive class descriptions allow one to determine properties of an object from knowledge of its class membership.

There is a fair amount of experimental evidence that conjunctive rules are easier to learn than disjunctive rules (Haygood & Bourne, 1965). Bourne (1974) has proposed that the relative difficulty of conjunctive and disjunctive rules arises from pre-experimental biases or preferences that favor conjunctive concepts, but results of experimental tests of this idea have either contradicted it (e.g., Dominowski & Wetherick, 1976) or suggested that biases may not be consistent over stimulus types (Reznick & Richman, 1976). Therefore, although the preponderance of evidence suggests that conjunctive rules are easier than disjunctive rules, the support for this claim is far from universal.

3. Sensitivity to Cue Validity

Cue validity has long played a part in theories of perceptual categorization (e.g., Beach, 1964). The validity of a given cue or property for a category is defined as the probability that an entity is a member of a category given that it has that cue or property. For the special case where cue validity is equal to unity, a cue or feature is said to be sufficient (though it may not be necessary) for determining category membership. The basic idea is that organisms are sensitive to properties or cues which allow them to make correct categorizations. Elio and Anderson (1981) noted that people seemed especially sensitive to sufficient features in classification learning. As applied to rule induction in categorization, features entering into inductions should tend to be those that discriminate between categories. For example, having hollow bones has greater cue validity than being of a certain size, in differentiating birds and mammals.

4. Sensitivity to Category Validity

Category validity is defined as the logical converse of cue validity, namely, as the probability that an entity has some feature or cue given that it belongs to a category (Tversky, 1977). For the special case where category validity of a cue is equal to unity, the cue or feature may be said to be necessary (though it may not be sufficient) for category membership. To see that category validity is not the same as cue validity, one may note that category validity does not take into account whether a feature or cue is possessed by members of alternative categories. For example, having two legs would have no cue validity with respect to differentiating *birds* from *people*. Category validity is similar to the correlated attribute principle in that it focuses on inferences that can be made from knowledge of category membership. As applied to rule induction, one might speculate that features entering into inductions will tend to be those that are widespread within a category.

5. Preference for Positive over Negative Features

There is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that people have difficulty in processing negative information (e.g., Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). In the Neisser and Weene (1962) framework, negative features always involve an extra operation which would serve to increase task complexity. One might expect people to prefer descriptions (rules) which minimize or do not involve negative features or properties. Recent studies show that this holds specifically in cases when subjects use a verbal problem representation. Subjects using a mental imagery strategy apparently are not affected by the negation (Hunt, 1983).

These five candidate constraints do not add up to a theory of induction. Rather, they reveal an unsettled state of affairs. It is unclear how the various factors trade off against or compliment each other. A general question, then, is how one ought to express constraints or preferences associated with rule induction. Specifically, one may think of constraints as directly determining the *result* or outcomes of induction or they may act indirectly by being embodied in the *process* of rule induction.

Process versus Product Constraints

The majority of psychological research has been directed at constraints stated in terms of products or outcomes. Keil (1981) offers some cogent arguments and evidence for the view that one should look for domain-specific constraints developed in terms of structures (or products) rather than processes. Keil takes the somewhat uneven picture on the relative difficulty of different types of rules as supporting the futility of looking for domain-general constraints.

Although our position is compatible with Keil's in some respects, in other respects it is the logical converse. We agree with Keil in that if one is committed to developing constraints in terms of particular structures or outputs, then such constraints will very likely be domain-specific. The focus of our present work, however, is the claim that if one is looking for domain-general constraints, then they should be embodied in the processing assumptions of models of performance. To some extent, the distinction between process and output is artificial in that the two must necessarily be intimately linked. Pragmatically, however, there is a clear difference. The focus on products reflects the faith that output constraints will form a coherent picture. This may arise because there is a many-to-one mapping between alternative underlying processes and outputs or because domains limit the set of plausible processing mechanisms.

In contrast, the focus on processing principles carries with it the conviction that coherence more readily emerges in terms of process constraints. For example, it may be possible to account for the mixed picture on the relative difficulty of conjunctive versus disjunctive rules cited earlier in terms of a single underlying processing model. That is, instead of different processes yielding the same output, a small set of processing mechanisms may (systematically) produce a variety of performances. In addition, processing constraints may provide more clues for dealing with the problem of too many possible inductions. As an extreme, one might imagine an induction system that attempts to produce all possible inductions and then runs them through an evaluation function that selects the ones with the appropriate properties (those that obey the right product constraints). A contrasting system embodying processing constraints might be able to generate a tiny subset of the possible inductions but, in an efficient and effective system, these would be just the desired subset. Limiting the number of inductions considered and selecting the "right" ones would be accomplished in a single set of steps in terms of processing principles. The danger associated with this commitment to processing principles is that one will formulate models which are too narrow and task-specific. Although any small set of experiments is likely to be susceptible to this latter criticism, we believe that our studies do illustrate the value of looking for processing constraints.

One rationale for seeking such constraints is that this seems to be the natural way to evaluate relationships among the five candidate constraints that we have just discussed. Unfortunately, there is no extant psychological model that provides a processing account of how people provide inductive generalizations or rules for preclassified categories. Research on inductive learning in AI, however, has proposed answers to the questions we have been considering in the form of working computer programs. One of the major purposes of the present paper is to examine the extent to which the constraints or preferences embodied in these AI programs also act as con-

straints for human rule induction. That is, we will treat these programs as a first approximation to a psychological theory of rule induction. As will be seen, there are numerous parallels between candidate constraints derived from cognitive psychology and biases incorporated into AI programs. We will describe a psychological process model, referred to as the Patch model, that was inspired by a particular AI induction program, INDUCE. A second major purpose in our comparison of human and machine rule induction is to see if processing principles from human rule induction provide any clues for the enhancement of methods embodied in machine inductive learning.

Although there are numerous inductive learning systems (see Dietterich and Michalski, 1981, 1983, for a detailed review) we will primarily be concerned with one particular program, INDUCE. There are three main reasons for our focus. The first reason is that INDUCE was specifically designed with the criterion of human comprehensibility in mind (the rules should make sense or seem natural to people: see Michalski, 1980, 1983a, 1983b), and, therefore, it may be a good candidate for a process model. The second is that the stimulus materials which we employed require structured descriptions, and many AI systems do not have descriptive languages that are this powerful. The third reason is more pragmatic and not specific to INDUCE. We cannot describe all the inductive learning algorithms that have been proposed (again see Dietterich & Michalski, 1981, 1983) because illustrating our approach requires far more detail than otherwise might be provided. In the general discussion we will provide a more detailed summary of the adequacy of other AI induction programs as psychological models. First, however, we turn our attention to INDUCE.

III. CONSTRAINTS IN THE INDUCE PROGRAM

Michalski's program, INDUCE, contains both processing constraints and product preferences. The processing constraints are primarily embodied in the algorithm that performs inductions and the product constraints are contained in a parameterized evaluation function that orders the rules in terms of their desirability. In general, the program performs a heuristic search through a space of candidate symbolic descriptions which are generated by the application of various inference rules to the initial observational statements. The following paragraphs describe INDUCE in a general way and the reader is referred to Michalski (1980, 1983a, 1983b) for a more detailed, technical presentation of INDUCE.

To see how INDUCE works, it will be helpful to have a specific example in mind. Figure 1 shows the set of trains that was used in the first experiment (described in Section V). The trains differ in numerous properties such as wheel color, car shape, and load shape. The five trains on the left are said to


be Eastbound and the five trains on the right are said to be Westbound. The task for INDUCE, as well as our experimental participants, is to come up with a rule that could be used to determine whether a train is Eastbound or Westbound. It should be obvious that there is a large set of potential rules ranging from describing the union of descriptions of individual examples to the most general possible assertion. A central issue is whether or not the forms of rules people develop are similar to those constructed by INDUCE.

Descriptions and Rules

The initial input to INDUCE consists of a set of observational statements characterizing each example. For instance, each car of the train may be described as being long or short, as having a particular shape, and so on. These elementary descriptors, attributes, functions or predicates may be nominal (e.g., sex), linear (e.g., length), or hierarchically structured (e.g., shape, with values such as triangle, square, polygon, etc.).

The descriptors used in the input data are not necessarily the final descriptors used in inductive assertions. In the process of formulating inductive generalizations INDUCE applies various generalization rules to develop more general descriptions from the initial observational statements. These generalization rules can be classified as either *selective* or *constructive*. Selective inference rules directly incorporate descriptors used in initial concept descriptions. Examples of selective rules include *turning constants into variables* (e.g., replacing "red" by "any color"), *dropping conditions* (assuming that some property is irrelevant), and *closing intervals* (e.g., if entities have values of either four or six on some dimension, then this operation would transform the description to "value between 4 and 6"), creating *internal disjunction* (e.g., "value 4 or 5 or 6"), and *climbing a generalization tree* for hierarchically structured variables transforming "Chicago or Dekalb or Peoria" into "Illinois"). Negative descriptors are not normally employed except in two situations. The first exception is that a negative descriptor may be used if it will allow for a more succinct expression. For example, given a choice between "triangle or rectangle or pentagon or ellipse or circle" and "not square" the latter description would be used. The second situation occurs when using the generalization rule called *extension against*. If example A is positive and example B is negative, then the rule creates the negation of any property in B that is not shared by A. Such a negation is the most general assertion describing A and excluding B (Michalski, 1983a).

Constructive generalization rules involve creating new descriptors not present in the original observational statements. For example, there is a *counting rule* such that if some attribute appears a number of times, a new descriptor based on frequency (e.g., "two red circles") may be created.



East Trains **West Trains**

Figure 1. The two groups of trains, Eastbound and Westbound, presented to subjects in Experiment 1.

Another rule, *generating chain properties*, creates descriptions based on ordered relationships such as "first", "middle" or "last" in a series. Other constructive generalization rules exploit descriptor interdependence such as might be present when attributes are correlated. For particular domains, the user may suggest additional constructive generalization rules.

General Algorithm

The algorithm realizes the so-called star method of induction (Michalski, 1983a) which focuses on various single positive examples and contrasts them with negative examples. Although the descriptive language and generalization rules are important and in part are motivated by psychological considerations, the induction algorithm contains the major processing constraints that are of present interest. INDUCE begins with a set of descriptions of entities, then selects a target category (say, the Eastbound trains) and proceeds as follows.

1. An example (called the "seed") from the target (positive) category is randomly selected.
2. The seed is then described in various alternative and general ways (this set is called a "star") without contradicting (applying to) examples of the contrasting category. In the process of generating such candidate descriptions, both selective and constructive generalization rules are applied. Note that the descriptions produced by generalizing a single example can always be conjunctive.
3. Descriptions on the candidate list are then evaluated according to a preference criterion. This criterion is set up at the beginning of the process to reflect the underlying learning goal. Consistency and completeness are used as general constraints. A description is *consistent* if it does not apply to any members of the contrast set (i.e., it has no counterexample). This is equivalent to cue validity being equal to unity, if the entire description is treated as a single cue. A description is *complete* if it applies to all members of the target category. This is equivalent to a description having a category validity of unity. Descriptions that are consistent and complete represent alternative solutions and are saved.
4. Alternative descriptions are ordered according to the preference criterion and the best description is selected.
5. If the description covers all the positive examples, then a solution has been found and the process stops. Otherwise, all positive examples covered (explained) by it are removed from the original set, a new seed is selected from the remaining examples, and the process repeats.
6. The solution is either a single conjunctive description or a disjunction of such descriptions (which happens when the process repeats more than once). Thus, INDUCE has an inherent bias toward conjunctive

descriptions; when it cannot find one it creates a disjunctive description. The solution is consistent and optimal with respect to the preference criterion.

The Preference Criterion

As an example of how the algorithm might work, consider again the trains in Figure 1. INDUCE might pick one of the Westbound trains having two cars as a seed and note that the rule "West trains have two cars" is consistent (there are no counter-examples) but not complete. This rule may be saved (see Step 5 in the algorithm) and attention would shift to (one of) the two trains not covered by the rule. For the reduced set, the rule "West trains have a jagged top" would be generated as both complete and consistent. The two rules generated would be combined to form the rule "West trains have two cars or a jagged top" which is consistent and complete for the entire set of trains. The quality of any particular description is evaluated according to a combination of criteria defined by the user. The preference criterion provides a set of elementary preferences (product constraints) that apply to the rules generated by the algorithm. Elementary preferences include, for example, consistency, completeness, and a combined measure of simplicity and the "fit" between observations and descriptions. The measure of simplicity may involve costs of measuring values, the memory requirements, and the number of descriptors and operators used in the generated inductive assertion. Simplicity encourages short, general, and easily computed descriptions. The notion of fit is designed to avoid overly general rules and is to a large extent in opposition to simplicity. Fit refers to how well an inductive assertion matches the examples of the target set and is defined as the amount of uncertainty that any given description satisfying the inductive assertion corresponds to an actual example. For example, if the target set contained a small red triangle and a large red triangle and the contrast set consisted of a blue circle and a green triangle, then the solution "red and triangle" would have a better fit (and be less general) than the assertion "red." These elementary criteria are combined into one measure by the lexicographic evaluation function (Michalski, 1983a). We will not describe the preference function in greater detail other than to note that it allows multiple evaluation criteria and is formally similar to Tversky's (1972) elimination by aspects model of choice behavior.

The preference criterion is fairly flexible. For example, by appropriate "weighting" of simplicity and fit one can produce either *characteristic descriptions*, which focus on properties common to a class, or *discriminant descriptions*, which focus on properties necessary to differentiate between classes.

The parallels between the constraints drawn from cognitive psychology and those associated with INDUCE are quite close. INDUCE has a notion

of simplicity, embodies a bias favoring conjunctive descriptions, and generally avoids negative features. The issue of cue validity versus category validity corresponds to the difference between discriminant and characteristic descriptions. INDUCE embodies certain processing constraints and parameterizes product constraints in terms of its preference criterion function. Again we shall pay more attention to the processing constraints, but the product constraints are also of interest in that it may be possible to convert them into processing constraints in a modified model.¹

The preceding description of INDUCE is somewhat oversimplified. By altering the preference criterion, INDUCE can execute a variety of inductive processes. INDUCE also allows one to control the process speed by a "search scope" parameter (called MAXSTAR). In this sense INDUCE is not so much a specific model of induction as it is a set of potential procedures that can be tailored according to the task demands or a user's goals. Indeed, the general methodology has been instantiated in a variety of ways (e.g., Michalski, Mozetic, Hong, & Lavrac, 1986). For present purposes, however, we will operate at the level of the general algorithm described here because it provides insight into one major aspect of human rule induction in our experiments.

IV. GENERAL COMPARISON AND EVALUATION STRATEGY

The preceding analysis of constraints on inductive inference suggests a research strategy. First of all, evidence is needed bearing on the validity and importance of these candidate constraints on rule induction in classification. If more than one factor emerges as important, then followup studies can be targeted at the relative significance of each factor. A related question will be how general any constraints prove to be across tasks.

In the present studies the program INDUCE is used as a potential model of human inductive learning. To the extent that INDUCE captures people's inferences, it will receive support as a psychological model and will provide a framework for evaluating the relative importance of different factors influencing the naturalness of inductions. If the processes associated with

¹ The goals of AI and cognitive psychology do not always coincide perfectly. The preference function associated with INDUCE gives the program important flexibility that allows it to be tailored to specific applications. In addition, there is no particular reason to saddle an induction program with exactly the set of human limitations. For example, in a fixed amount of time a program should be able to consider a larger set of alternative rules than people can. Correspondingly, there may be a greater need for a program to select from or edit candidate rules. We are not so committed to a processing account of human rule induction that we think that people never edit or select among alternative rules. There is a need to study how people evaluate candidate rule inductions. In our present experimental circumstances, however, the main challenge is to provide an account of how people come up with at least one rule.

people's development of inductive generalizations show systematic differences from INDUCE, then these differences can be used both to modify INDUCE (if the differences involve factors that may provide useful constraints on induction or increase comprehensibility) and to develop psychological models of people's inductive generalizations (in the event that the differences are that people depart from what is useful or optimal).

The above comments are both more general and more vague than they ideally might be. We think there are at least three issues that bear closer examination: (1) fixing a descriptive language, (2) the meaning of treating an AI program as a "psychological model," and (3) determining the appropriate strategy for making claims about generality. Each of these issues will be discussed in turn, although a more complete discussion of the third issue is left until the general discussion.

Fixing a Descriptive Language

Many people have argued that *the* central issue in induction is the set of processes that determine the basic units of analysis and the associated descriptive language. We do not attempt to address this issue in this paper. Nonetheless, the experiments can be seen as a test of the adequacy of descriptive language associated with INDUCE. As noted by Dietterich and Michalski (1981, 1983), several AI induction programs do not incorporate structural descriptions. One of our goals is to see if people's rule inductions employ descriptions in a manner not captured by INDUCE.

One might argue that unless the descriptive language is fixed the whole issue of the form of rules (conjunctive versus disjunctive) becomes irrelevant. The idea is that the same concept can be, for example, either conjunctive or disjunctive, depending on the feature set chosen; for example, the concept of "cousin" could be stated either as "the child of a sibling" or "the son or daughter of a brother or sister." We believe this argument is misplaced, because it implies that the feature set is chosen after the rule induction has been performed. It seems far more likely that feature set selection is either prior to or simultaneous with rule induction. Indeed, some set of features may be selected *because* it permits a conjunctive rule rather than vice versa (we see evidence for this in our studies, especially in Experiments 2 and 3).

AI Programs as Psychological Models

It should be obvious that there are a variety of criteria that could be used to evaluate programs like INDUCE. First of all, INDUCE would be a powerful psychological model if it produced all and only those rules given by human subjects. Alternatively, given the flexibility associated with the evaluation function it might be that people's rules were a proper subset of the rules given by INDUCE. Still another useful result would be that the subset

of people's rules that other people rated as "good" rules would be produced by INDUCE. Of course, rules can be analyzed more abstractly and it might be important to establish whether or not the *types* of rules given by people and an AI program match.

A second approach, which we favor, is to see if there are general correspondences between the algorithm associated with an AI program and the processes that give rise to human rule inductions. Presumably the particular rules given contain some hints about underlying processes but, as we shall see, product or outcome constraints may not hold across tasks where the same general processes appear to be operating. It is difficult to be precise about the level of detail at which one ought to compare an algorithm with a psychological process model, but the present studies show that it is feasible to abstract both high level similarities and some important differences.

Determining Generality

Although we will later consider the issue of generality in some detail, it is important to state some disclaimers from the outset. First of all, it follows from what we have just said that one ought to look for generality in terms of processing rather than product constraints. Secondly, certain types of generalizations are clearly inappropriate. For example, certain constructive generalization rules are very likely to be domain-specific. Selective generalization rules such as *climbing a generalization tree* are likely to be used more often (see Winston, 1975).

A second boundary condition on generality is that in the absence of information about the appropriate descriptive language and without at least ballpark notions about a process model, speculations about generality are probably meaningless. So, for example, we make no claims that a process model for the induction of classification rules will embody the same constraints as a process model for the induction of syntactic rules of English (but see Berwick, 1986, and Bowerman, in press). On the other hand, we will present evidence that some of the processing biases associated with our highly artificial experimental situation extend to more realistic and practically important diagnostic classification tasks.

V. EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISONS

EXPERIMENT 1

The first experiment was exploratory and employed a combination of classification construction (sorting) and rule induction tasks. The stimulus materials consisted of the 10 trains shown in Figure 1. Participants were asked to perform four tasks. First, they were to arrange the trains into any number of groups (classes) in a way that made sense to them. Second, they

were asked to describe the basis for their classifications. Then participants were asked to perform two additional classification construction tasks. The first had the constraint that there should be exactly two categories of equal size (of five members each). The second was identical to the initial unconstrained task except that participants were told that they could employ an "else" category for trains that did not fit any of their preferred groupings. Finally, in the fourth task, participants were told that the 5 trains on the left side of Figure 1 were Eastbound, that the trains on the right side were Westbound, and that their task was to come up with a rule that could be used to decide if a new train was East- or Westbound. Thus, the first three tasks dealt with classification construction and the fourth dealt with learning rules from examples.

There were several objectives in this initial study. The category construction tasks were given in order to: (1) Determine which particular properties would be salient for people, (2) See whether or not people would spontaneously construct the categories to be used in the later rule induction task, and (3) Provide people with some familiarity with the stimuli before the rule induction task. In addition, the experiment provided a data base of descriptions that could be used to evaluate the adequacy of the generalization rules associated with INDUCE. To sharpen this comparison, half of the participants were told which features were relevant (the same ones as used in the initial input to INDUCE) and half were not. If INDUCE represents a plausible model of human rule inductions, then processing constraints associated with INDUCE will be reflected in the human data.

Method

Subjects. The subjects were 64 undergraduates (male and female) attending the University of Illinois, who were paid for their participation in the experimental session which lasted about one hour. The participants were randomly assigned to either the Standard group or the Informed group. Because of a procedural error, the data from one of the participants in the Informed condition could not be used.

Stimuli. The stimulus materials consisted of the drawings of 10 trains shown in Figure 1. The trains were mounted on 7.6 cm by 12.7 cm index cards. As may be seen in Figure 1, the trains could differ in the number and shape of cars, in their tops and loads, and in the number and color of their wheels.

Procedure. The experimental procedure consisted of the above mentioned set of classification construction tasks followed by a rule induction task. Participants were tested individually. Details of the procedure follow.

1. *Free Classification.* For the initial task, participants were asked to carefully look over the trains and then to put them into groups in a way that made sense to them. After this free classification was completed, each participant was asked for a justification of his or her groupings.

2. *Constrained Classification Construction.* For the next task, participants were asked to put the trains into two equal-sized groups in a way that made sense. Then participants were asked again to justify their partitionings.

3. *Free Classification with "Else" Category.* The last partitioning task was identical to the first, except that participants were told that they could have a "junk" category for trains that did not fit in with other groups.

4. *Rule-Induction.* For the rule induction task, participants were presented with the two groups of trains corresponding to the left and right half of Figure 1 and told that one group was Eastbound and the other Westbound. They were told that their task was to come up with a rule that could be used to decide if a train was East- or Westbound. Participants performing these tasks were divided into the Standard and the Informed group.

Participants in the *Standard* group were not presented with any description of the trains. Participants in the *Informed* group were told at the start of the experiment that the following set of attributes was relevant: shape of cars, number of cars, length of cars, number of loads, shape of loads, type of car top (open or closed), number of wheels, and color of wheels (white or black).

Results

The results will be presented separately for each of the sortings and the rule induction test. The data on category construction mainly are relevant to the issue of the adequacy of the descriptive language associated with INDUCE and they will only be described briefly.² The more general reader may wish to skip to the data on East-West rules.

Sorting. In the free classification task most of the participants constructed groups of trains on the basis of a single property although a significant minority used a conjunction of properties. No one described their sorting as involving a disjunction of properties. Of the partitionings based on a single property, *number of cars* was the predominant basis for classification, accounting for about three-fourths of the unidimensional groupings. There were few, if any, differences between the Standard and the

² A more detailed description of these data is available upon request.

Informed condition. The possible exception is that in partitions based on a conjunction of properties, six persons in the Standard condition but only one in the Informed condition used some combination of car position (first, middle, last) with another property. Car position was not given as a relevant dimension to participants in the Informed condition. The INDUCE program was not given car position as a descriptor but it could produce it as a descriptor using the Generating Chain Properties Rule. Finally, none of the descriptions involved negative properties or attributes.

When participants were asked to sort the trains into equal-sized groups, they continued to employ single properties or conjunctions of properties. Again, there were no obvious differences between the Standard and Informed conditions. Color of engine wheels was the most common basis for sorting in both groups. The presence or absence of a particular shape (e.g., rectangles) was the next most popular strategy among people using a single property. One participant in each condition sorted on the basis of whether or not the loads on a train were all different. This strategy would be captured by constructive generalization rules in INDUCE. Slightly more than a fourth of the participants used a combination of properties. For example, the partition might be defined in terms of whether or not there was a circle load in the last car. Finally, one participant in the Standard condition used a disjunctive description. Negative properties were not mentioned except where an entire category was defined by exclusion from the alternative category. No participant sorted the trains in a manner corresponding to Eastbound and Westbound categories in Figure 1.

Almost every participant used a different classification principle when they were allowed to employ a miscellaneous category from the one they used on the initial free classification. In addition, every participant put at least one train into the else category. Both of these results probably arise from implicit task demands rather than some intrinsic property associated with being able to use a junk category. One major change which does not appear to be a function of implicit expectations is that the predominant basis for sorting shifted from being based on a single property to a combination of properties. The increased use of conjunctions of properties was associated with an increased variety of property combinations. For example, participants used conjunctions of load shapes, car shapes, and load shapes in same versus adjacent cars. Descriptions involving conjunctions of shape are not incorporated into current versions of INDUCE. Car position was used by more participants in the Standard condition (8) than in the Informed condition (2). No descriptions involved negative properties and no one employed a disjunctive description.

East-West Rule. Of greatest interest is performance on the rule induction task. The results are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Breakdown of Solutions to Rule Induction Task in Experiment 1.

Solution Type	Standard Method	Informed Method
Simple Property		
Number of Different Loads (East: 3 or more different loads)	2	2
Conjunction of Properties		
Positive Features only (e.g., East: triangle load and 3 or more loaded cars)	2	2
With Negative Features (e.g., East: 3 or more cars and triangle load and not jagged car top)	8	7
Conjunction Total	10	9
Disjunction of Properties		
Simple (e.g., West: two cars or jagged top)	12	5
Disjunction of Conjunction Positive properties only (e.g., 2 cars or long cars and 2 white wheels)	1	9
Negative properties included (e.g., East: at least 1 black wheel on engine and not 3 circular loads or (diamond shape load and not black wheels)	4	1
Disjunction Total	17	15
Mixed Types (e.g., East: conjunctive: West: disjunctive)	1	2
Other (e.g., partial rules, descriptions of the various trains)	2	3
Total People	32	31

The numbers in the table refer to the number of participants giving a particular type of rule.

The task proved to be quite difficult. Two people in each condition discovered a simple classifier based on the number of different loads (East trains have three or more different loads). About a third of the participants employed conjunctions of properties. A large majority of conjunctive rules made use of negative properties. About half of the participants used a disjunctive description, the most popular of which was the simple rule that Westbound trains have two cars or a jagged top. Many of the disjunctive

descriptions, however, were fairly elaborate and involved conjunctions of properties as part of the disjunctive rule. When negative properties were part of these complex disjunctions, they usually (but not always) were associated with a part involving a conjunction of properties. Finally, a few participants were unable to come up with rules and either gave partial rules or detailed descriptions of particular trains. Three participants in the Standard condition and four in the Informed condition gave rules that did not perfectly partition the trains. (See footnote 2.)

Overall, the results are generally consistent with INDUCE. The one exception is that people tended to begin with rules that had counterexamples (e.g., three or more cars) and then eliminate the counterexamples by using negative properties (as in the rule, East: three or more cars and not a jagged top). INDUCE does specialize overly general rules but not by negating properties of contrasting categories. As will be seen, this pattern is consistent with the Patch model for rule induction to be described next.

Theoretical Analysis

The Patch Model for Rule Induction. It is convenient to characterize performance in terms of consistency and completeness. Recall that consistency refers to descriptions that have no counterexamples but may not cover all known members of a category, whereas completeness refers to descriptions that cover all members of a category but may have counterexamples (i.e., apply to members of alternative categories). Current versions of INDUCE look for consistent and complete descriptions ("candidate hypotheses") but are influenced more by consistency than completeness. The data from human subjects are best accounted for by the idea that completeness may be at least as important as consistency in the initial phases of rule formulation. Therefore, not only is it the case that consistent rules are modified to make them complete but also complete rules are modified to make them consistent.

In order to explain the observed pattern of results we developed a process model for rule induction which we call the Patch model. The Patch model is similar in spirit to INDUCE, although the processing assumptions are less formal and patch does not exist as a computer program. The model has been named the Patch model to capture people's propensity to patch up rather than discard partially correct rules. The basic processing assumptions are as follows: People focus on one category and begin by looking for a descriptor that spans the positive set and does not apply to any counterexample. If one is found, then a simple rule can be generated. If no single descriptor works, because there are counterexamples, then one of two strategies may be applied. If there are numerous counterexamples, then people

may look for combinations of properties (e.g., "X and Y") that span the set but do not generate counterexamples. If there are only a few counterexamples, then people may attempt to eliminate them by negating properties of the counterexamples not present in the positive set. For example, a person may notice that all Eastbound trains have a triangle load but that two Westbound trains also do. This description is complete but not consistent. They might then look for combinations of properties that apply to the East but not the West trains. For example they might consider the rule "triangle load in nonlast car," but that rule would still have a counterexample. Next a person might consider properties true of these two Westbound trains that are not shared by the East trains. For example, they might notice that the two West train counterexamples have a long car with two white wheels and then generate the rule "Eastbound trains have a triangle load and not long cars with two white wheels." We will refer to this type of rule as an "opportunistic conjunction."

The other main possibility is that a descriptor will be found that has no counterexamples but fails to span the positive set. In that event people form a disjunction using the initial descriptor and then confine attention to the reduced positive set and the contrast set. For example, they might notice that only Westbound trains have two cars, and then focus on differences between the remaining two Westbound trains and the Eastbound trains. They might notice that the remaining West trains both have jagged tops and generate the rule "Westbound trains have two cars or a jagged top." This part of the process model is functionally equivalent to INDUCE and the above rule is one of those that INDUCE actually discovers. We will refer to this type of rule as an "opportunistic disjunction."

This account seems quite consistent with the present results. The descriptor, number of different loads, was apparently not very salient (it would involve a constructive rule for INDUCE) and few participants found the simple rule based on it. As judged by the initial free sorting, *number of cars* was quite salient and many people found the simple disjunction, two cars or jagged top. According to the Patch model, negative descriptors (e.g., not jagged top) should be part of conjunctions and not part of disjunctions. This held for 17 of the 20 cases where negative descriptors were used. The three exceptions seem to be cases where the reference (positive) set and the contrast (counterexample) set shifted at some point during the rule search. Two exceptions were of the form "not triangle or triangle and . . ." and the third was "not dark engine wheels or dark engine wheels and . . ." In this model the relative number of disjunctive and conjunctive rules would depend on the exact structure of the trains and the salience of the associated descriptors. In general, however, because people are assumed to initially focus on properties that members of the positive set have in common, conjunctive rules are likely to result.

Relation to INDUCE. In general the people's rules were quite similar to those produced by INDUCE. Both INDUCE and many participants appeared to discover consistent but not complete descriptors and then confine attention to the reduced positive set and the contrast set. This would produce disjunctive rules where one or more parts of the disjunction might consist of a conjunction of descriptors (see footnote 2). The descriptors in the rules were either consistent with the original descriptions given to INDUCE or could be readily produced by constructive generalization rules. The largest difference between solutions given by people and by INDUCE is that a fair number of people appeared to find descriptors that were complete but not consistent and then remove the inconsistencies by forming opportunistic conjunctions involving negation of properties. The current implementations of INDUCE focus on a list of consistent (but not necessarily complete) descriptions but do not allot similar attention to complete (but not consistent) descriptions.³

Discussion

The rule inductions were consistent with at least some of the biases outlined in the introduction. The partitionings were predominately either on the basis of a single property or on a conjunction of properties. This is consistent with the principles of simplicity, category validity, and a preference for conjunctions over disjunctions. The descriptions of these partitionings did not involve negative properties. The Informed group did not confine itself to the original list of properties but their new descriptors were consistent with the constructive generalization rules associated with INDUCE. There was no evidence that the descriptive language associated with INDUCE is insufficiently powerful to capture people's rule statements for this problem.

The main data are from the rule induction task and they manifested both disjunctions and negative properties. The negative properties almost always were part of conjunctive descriptions and fit quite well with the Patch model that assumes that when people find a descriptor that spans a set but is consistent with some members in the contrast set, they attempt to eliminate these counterexamples by developing a rule based on negating their properties. In addition to the "opportunistic conjunctions," "opportunistic disjunctions" arise when a salient descriptor has no counterexamples but fails to span the positive set. INDUCE does not develop "opportunistic conjunctions" because current versions of INDUCE do not have an intermediate stage where complete but not consistent solutions are saved. Although in

³ Actually, there is a current version of INDUCE which does form opportunistic conjunctions that grew out of this research project. For our purposes it will be convenient to describe our results in terms of the Patch model and earlier versions of INDUCE.

principle INDUCE could be modified along these lines, for present purposes it will be most convenient to describe our results both in terms of INDUCE and the Patch model.

EXPERIMENT 2

Although the first experiment was useful by being complicated enough to give INDUCE a serious test, the study did not provide any strong contrasts among alternative constraint principles. The second experiment was concerned only with rule induction and it included a contrast between the predictions of Patch (and INDUCE) and AI induction programs that develop discrimination nets ordered by cue validity. The experiment was designed specifically to pit conjunction and category validity against disjunction and cue validity. The stimuli were simplified trains shown in Figure 2. The experimental task was to come up with a basis for determining whether a train was Eastbound or Westbound. As in the first experiment, there are many possible inductive generalizations consistent with Figure 2, and the main question is which of these people typically generate. We were particularly interested in the relative preponderance of conjunctive and disjunctive rules because the alternative processing algorithms make different predictions about the rules likely to be generated. Note that Eastbound trains can be described either by the rule "long car *and* triangle load in car" or by the rule "open car *or* white wheels on car". The conjunctive rule combines two properties each having high category validity and lower cue validity and the disjunctive rule combines two properties each high in cue validity and lower in category validity. In terms of the number of descriptors and operators needed the two types of rules are equally simple but INDUCE and Patch predict that conjunctive solutions will be more frequent than disjunctive solutions. Note that this prediction holds for the present set of stimulus materials. Indeed, in the first experiment there were more disjunctive rules given than conjunctive rules. Although the various train properties are not counterbalanced across participants, it would be hard to explain rule preferences in terms of the salience of stimulus dimensions. For example, if car length and load type were salient it might produce a bias for conjunctive rules involving Eastbound trains but it also ought to produce a corresponding bias for disjunctive rules (West = short car or circle load) involving Westbound trains.

This prediction of a bias toward rule constituents that have high category validity is not a property of all inductive learning algorithms. For example, one might imagine a process model which initially computes the cue validity of each descriptor, orders descriptors first by cue validity and secondly by category validity, and then develops rules by going down the list of descriptors until a rule is created which is consistent and complete. Whenever no

single descriptor was both consistent and complete, disjunctive rules would be produced. A related algorithm would determine the information value (rather than the cue validity) of candidate test properties and develop a discrimination net with the most informative test occupying each node in the network. This is the procedure embodied in the ID3 technique of Quinlan (1975, 1979). In the present task, the consistent-but-not-complete and complete-but-not-consistent descriptors are mirror images of each other, so there is no reason to expect a preference for one type of rule over the other, according to Quinlan's framework.




Figure 2. The two groups of trains, Eastbound and Westbound, presented to subjects in Experiment 2.

Method

Subjects. The subjects were 66 male and female undergraduates attending the University of Illinois who participated in this experiment in partial fulfillment of course requirements in introductory psychology. Participants were run in groups of 10 to 15 and the experiment lasted about 10 minutes.

Stimuli. The stimulus materials consisted of six trains placed on a single sheet of paper as shown in Figure 2. The trains differed from each other in color of car wheels, car loads, car length, car top, engine door and window color, and engine wheel color. A given property either was true of all members of one class but had counterexamples in the contrast category, or was true of only some members of one class but had no counterexamples. These two types of properties can be thought of as maximizing category validity and cue validity, respectively.

Procedures. Participants were given the sheet of six trains and their East-West designation and asked to examine them. They were told to come up with a basis for classification that could be used to predict whether a new train would be Eastbound or Westbound and that, at a minimum, the basis for classification should properly classify the six trains on the sheet.

Results

We first present some preliminary information concerning performance. There was some ambiguity as to whether a basis for classifying both sets of trains was needed or whether one set could be defined by exclusion. Out of 66 participants, three gave a criterion characterizing only one of the sets. The remaining 63 people provided some basis for classifying each set, but there is reason to believe that the primary focus was on Eastbound trains. In scoring descriptions or rules for whether or not they could be used to successfully classify the trains, one finds that for 17 participants the Eastbound classification principle was adequate but the Westbound one incomplete, whereas for only 3 participants the Westbound principle was adequate and the Eastbound incomplete. For 7 participants both the East and West classification principles were incomplete. Also, the instructions did not specifically ask for a statement of a decision rule and a significant number of people, 27, only provided a list of descriptors that might be useful in classifying trains.

The main results reveal a very strong preference for conjunctive rules. Since it was possible for people to give different forms of classification rules for the East and West sets, the details supporting this generalization are a little complicated. Altogether, 34 people gave a conjunctive rule for East trains, and of these, 20 also gave a conjunctive rule for West trains, 7 gave a disjunctive rule for West trains, and 7 simply gave a description of West

trains but no rule that could be used to classify the trains. One person gave a disjunctive rule for both East and West trains and three people gave a disjunctive rule for one set (2 West, 1 East) and did not provide a basis for classifying the alternative set. Two people gave both a conjunctive and disjunctive rule for East Trains. As a whole, then, the rule statements showed a strong bias for conjunctive over disjunctive rules.

A further breakdown of classification principles offered by participants is shown in Table 2. Conjunctive rules predominate over disjunctive rules. More than the minimum information necessary to classify the trains was contained in 21 of the 57 conjunctive rules. For example, a typical East rule was "long cars and triangle load and black rectangles on engine." This implies that the people were not focussing exclusively on discriminant descriptions. Only two rule statements mentioned negative features and both of those cases appear to embody the Extension Against principle (e.g., from the rule West: circle or short developing the rule, East: not circle and not short).

The descriptions also seem consistent with a conjunctive bias or at least a preference for category validity over cue validity. A very large majority of the descriptions mentioned properties that members of a set had in common (maximizing individual property category validity) compared with those possessed by some members of a set that were not present in the contrast set (maximizing individual property cue validity).

These results cannot be explained simply in terms of component salience. Although there is some evidence that people tended to use rules based on car length and load type, the dimensions employed in rules varied with whether

TABLE 2
Bases for Classification Provided by Participants in Experiment 2.

Rule	East	West
Conjunctive		
Simple	17(2)	19(4)
Redundant	17	4
Disjunctive	0	8(1)
Both	2	0
Description		
Common Properties	20(8)	24(17)
Distinctive Properties	4	3(1)
Common and Distinctive Properties		7(1)
None	2	1

The numbers refer to the number of participants for a given classification basis. The numbers in parentheses are the number of descriptions that would not successfully classify the trains.

the trains were East or West. Overall, 93% of the East rules mentioned car length or load type but only 27% of the West rules mentioned car length or load type. It appears that the form of the rule, conjunctive versus disjunctive, influenced performance much more than the salience of component properties.

Discussion

The main results of this experiment are in terms of both descriptions and rule statements, and they form a coherent picture. Although both rules were equally complex in terms of number of descriptors and operators, people showed a strong bias for conjunctive rather than disjunctive rules. The common properties entering into conjunctions maximize component category validity (probability of the property given the category) in contrast with the discriminative properties of disjunctive rules which maximize component cue validity (probability of the category given the property). For the protocols giving descriptions rather than rules there was a corresponding bias for common over distinctive properties.

This bias for conjunctive rules and common properties is consistent with the Patch model outlined earlier and with INDUCE. This bias arises from the assumption that the first stage in rule induction involves generating a description of properties that members of a set have in common and then refining it to exclude counterexamples. For the trains in Figure 2, the conjunction of two descriptors (e.g., dark wheels, closed top) has no counterexamples and a simple conjunctive rule can be discovered. The task of finding common properties should have been and apparently was easier than in the first experiment because fewer, less complex trains were employed. The results are inconsistent with the idea that properties are ordered by cue validity alone or information value alone and then developed into rules (by, for example, generating a discrimination net). Ordering by cue validity predicts a bias for disjunctive rules and ordering by information value predicts no bias.

According to the Patch model, the bias toward conjunctive rules involving affirmative properties is a byproduct of the underlying processing mechanisms. By making other properties of the trains salient, one ought to be able to push rules in the direction of opportunistic conjunctions and disjunctions. For example, if a single descriptor is complete but has a counterexample and the counter-example has a distinct, salient property, then one ought to see opportunistic conjunctions based on negating that property. We gave an additional 22 subjects the rule induction task involving the trains in Figure 2 but we added a smokestack to either the West train that had a triangle load (for half the subjects) or to the West train that had a long car. This change led to 11 simple or redundant conjunctive rules and, more importantly, 6 opportunistic conjunctive rules of the form "triangle load

and not smokestack" or "long car and not smokestack." There were also two rules of the form "circle load or smokestack" which may represent opportunistic disjunctions. The data from these additional subjects is, therefore, consistent with the Patch model.

The results of this experiment also show that rule induction is guided by more than simplicity or parsimony. Many of the rules contained more than the minimum number of necessary descriptors, which, in the framework of INDUCE, suggests that "fit" also influences inductive generalizations. These observations are also in accord with a bias toward characteristic descriptions over discriminant descriptions. This preference for fit to data (or, in other words, avoiding excessive generalizations) comes at the cost of simplicity but it has the benefit, in the case of conjunctive rules, that the descriptions list the inferences about properties that can be reliably drawn from knowledge of category membership.

EXPERIMENT 3

The third experiment used the same trains as the second and also was concerned with rule induction. The difference was that the examples were not presented all at once, but sequentially one by one. The examples were trains and participants had to learn to classify each of the six trains as East- or Westbound. At the end of learning, participants were asked for their basis of classification (i.e., the rules they had learned). The main question concerns how the rules will change under this sequential presentation procedure, which places more demands on memory than the simultaneous presentation used in Experiment 2.

In terms of our Patch model for inductive generalization the learning procedure might make it more difficult to discover properties that are complete or consistent. If a person finds a property that is complete but not consistent (e.g., long for East trains has one counterexample), they might treat the counterexample as an exception and eliminate it by describing it in detail. This might lead to a rule like "Trains with long cars are Eastbound except if they have a circle load." This would be an instance of what we have been referring to as an opportunistic conjunction. Another possibility is that a descriptor might be found which is consistent but not complete (e.g., the descriptor, "Westbound trains are short"). In that event, attention should focus on the remaining West train and one might see an opportunistic disjunctive rule like "Westbound trains are *short* or *long with a circular load*. Note that such a rule is different from the rule "Westbound trains are *short* or *have a circular load*" because it specifically combines circular load with long car. The Patch model, then, is consistent with disjunctive rules, but for the trains in Figure 2 at least one part of the disjunction should contain a conjunctive description.

Method

Subjects. The subjects were 20 male and female undergraduates attending Emory University who participated in this experiment in partial fulfillment of course requirements in introductory psychology.

Stimuli. The stimulus materials consisted of the six trains shown in Figure 2 which were individually mounted on index cards. The stimuli were otherwise identical to those used in Experiment 2. For half the subjects the trains on the left side of Figure 2 were in the East category and the trains on the right side were in the West category, and for the other half of the subjects this assignment was reversed.

Procedures. Each participant was tested individually. They were told that they would see trains differing in a number of properties and that their task was to learn to correctly classify the trains as Eastbound or Westbound. The individual cards were presented in a random order, subject to the constraints that a given train was never presented twice in a row and a given category never appeared more than four times in a row.

The experimenter first ran through the set of six trains twice and gave the correct category assignment as each card was presented. Thereafter the cards continued to be presented one at a time and the subject said whether they thought the train was in the East or West category and then was told whether they were correct or incorrect. There was a brief pause between every two runs and training continued until a participant was correct for each train in a block of two such runs. When the training criterion was met, the experimenter asked the subject to explain their criterion for classifying the trains as East or West. In addition to this general question, participants were specifically asked if they focused on one of the two categories.

Results

Every participant met the learning criterion and the overall average number of errors to criterion (calling an Eastbound train Westbound or vice versa) was 7.50. The solutions were generally in accord with the Patch processing model. All but 3 of the 20 participants focused on one of the two categories. The solution types are summarized in Table 3. With two exceptions, the solutions were conjunctive, involved opportunistic disjunctions or involved opportunistic conjunctions. One person simply memorized the trains and another described a configural property involving openness and brightness. Of the 23 solutions stated, 14 included redundant features. An example of this is the rule that West trains are *short or long with a circular load* when "short or circular load" would have been sufficient.

TABLE 3
Bases for Classification Provided by Participants in Experiment 3.

Basis for Classification	Number of Solutions
Conjunctive rule	
Simple (e.g., East: <u>Long and triangle load</u>)	6
Redundant (e.g., East: <u>Two wheels and triangle load and not short</u>)	1
Consistent descriptor plus condition (e.g., East: <u>open top or closed top and clear rear wheels</u>)	11
Complete descriptor plus conjunction to eliminate counterexample (e.g., East: <u>Long cars and not long with dark wheels and a circular load</u>)	3
Memorized Individual Trains	1
Configural ("East trains looked more open and bright")	1

The numbers refer to number of solutions for a given type and since 3 of the 20 participants said they had paid equal attention to both categories the total number of solutions is 23. The underlinings for the rule statements are intended to help parse the rule components.

Discussion

The main effect of switching to a learning paradigm appeared to be to make it more difficult to discover sets of consistent and complete descriptors. The predominant strategy was to select a single descriptor and narrow it by conjunctively describing the counter-example (creating an opportunistic conjunction) or to extend it by describing the additional train (creating an opportunistic disjunction). There were no cases in which the most simple disjunction solution was reported. Frequently, these redundant components were associated with descriptions that applied to a single train, either to include it or to exclude it. It is not clear whether this form of redundancy differs in any fundamental way from the type of redundancy noted earlier. This pattern of results is consistent with the Patch model.

EXPERIMENT 4

Although the results of the second and third experiments were clearcut, they are based on a single set of stimulus materials. This experiment used verbal descriptions of two categories of hypothetical people in the rule induction task. The abstract structure is again such that comparison can be

made between conjunctive rules derived from properties that are complete but not consistent and disjunctive rules derived from properties that are consistent but not complete. One reason for anticipating a different pattern of results with verbal materials is that combinations of properties might be much less salient. A second factor varied was whether or not the two properties that could be conjoined into a disjunctive or conjunctive rule were adjacent in the descriptions. Again, nonadjacent descriptions may favor consistency and disjunctive rules because it may be difficult to integrate information that is spatially separated.

Method

Subjects. The subjects were 54 male and female undergraduates attending the University of Illinois who participated in the study in partial fulfillment of course requirements in introductory psychology. Participants were run in groups of 3 to 4 and the experiment lasted about 10 minutes. The subjects were assigned to a condition where relevant dimensions were either adjacent (Adjacent Group, $n = 30$) or nonadjacent (Nonadjacent Group, $n = 24$).

Stimuli. The stimulus materials consisted of descriptions of two groups of six people placed on a single sheet of paper partitioned by group. Each description consisted of a value on each of six dimensions: Marital Status (Single or Married), Education (B.A. or M.A.), Sports (Golf or Tennis), Music (Rock or Jazz), Employment (Self-employed or Corporation) and Hobby (Painting, Photography, or Ceramics). For four of the six dimensions, a given value was true of all members of one class but had two counterexamples in the contrast category, or was true of some (four) members of one class but had no counterexamples. The former properties have maximal category validity and the latter have maximal cue validity.

It was possible to combine two complete but not consistent descriptors to form a valid conjunctive rule or to combine two consistent but not complete descriptors into a disjunctive rule. The relevant dimensions involved in either type of conjoining were either adjacent (first and second, third and fourth, or fifth and sixth) or nonadjacent (first and fourth, second and fourth, third and fifth, second and fifth). An example from the Nonadjacent condition is shown in Table 4. The two possible rules of central interest for the left category in Table 4 are "Married" and "Rock" versus "M.A." or "Self-employed" and for the right category are "B.A." and "Corporation" versus "Single" or "Jazz." Although each participant saw the same abstract structure, several different randomizations of positions and properties were employed to realize this abstract structure.

TABLE 4
An Example of the Classification Materials used in Experiment 4.

Category A	Category B
Married	Married
M.A.	B.A.
Golf	Tennis
Rock	Jazz
Self-employed	Corporation
Ceramics	Ceramics
Married	Single
M.A.	B.A.
Tennis	Golf
Rock	Rock
Self-employed	Corporation
Painting	Painting
Married	Single
B.A.	B.A.
Golf	Tennis
Rock	Rock
Self-employed	Corporation
Photography	Photography
Married	Single
M.A.	B.A.
Golf	Tennis
Rock	Jazz
Corporation	Corporation
Ceramics	Ceramics
Married	Single
M.A.	B.A.
Tennis	Golf
Rock	Jazz
Corporation	Corporation
Painting	Painting
Married	Married
B.A.	B.A.
Golf	Tennis
Rock	Jazz
Self-employed	Corporation
Photography	Photography

Each cluster of descriptors corresponds to an individual. In this example the dimensions relevant to a simple disjunctive or conjunctive rule are nonadjacent (1st and 4th or 2nd and 5th).

Procedure. Participants were given the sheet of twelve descriptions and their left-right grouping and asked to read them over carefully. They were told to come up with a basis for classifying the two groups that could be used to describe the groups and to determine the correct category membership for any new descriptions. For the Adjacent Group the pair of consistent descriptors or the pair of complete descriptors was always adjacent and for the Nonadjacent Group there was at least one intervening descriptor between the two members of a potential pair (see Table 4).

Results

The results were generally the same as for the second experiment—there was a strong preference for conjunctive rules based on complete but not consistent descriptors over disjunctive rules derived from consistent but not complete descriptors. In the Adjacent Group, 21 people gave a conjunctive rule and only 2 a disjunctive rule. Of the remaining six people, three simply listed relevant properties, one gave a very complex (and incorrect) rule and two integrated the dimensions into a composite personality statement (e.g., dependent versus independent people). All together, there were 34 conjunctive rules given and only 5 disjunctive rules. For 8 of the 34 conjunctive rules additional properties were mentioned, again suggesting that rules are not strongly constrained by simplicity. On three occasions only a single property was mentioned for a rule and in each case this was a complete but not consistent property.

The rule induction task proved to be more difficult for the Nonadjacent Group but the main pattern of results was the same. Eleven of the people gave conjunctive rules and no one gave a disjunctive rule. Eight people gave incomplete rules which can be further classified as consisting of a necessary feature (two people), a sufficient feature (one person), and both a necessary and sufficient feature (five people). Three people integrated the dimensions into a composite personality statement and the last person gave no rule. At the level of rules all 20 were conjunctive and 5 of these included an additional property.

Discussion

The switch from simple trains to verbal descriptions of people did not change the preference for conjunctive rules based on complete properties over disjunctive rules based on consistent properties. Furthermore, although the Nonadjacent condition dramatically reduced the proportion of people coming up with a successful rule (from 80% to 46%), it did not diminish this preference for conjunctive over disjunctive rules (it went from 88% to 100%).

This evidence that category validity plays an important role in rule induction apparently has at least modest generality. We found no evidence that

components are ordered by information value alone or cue validity alone and then developed into rules. Again the results are consistent with the Patch model.

VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The set of experiments in the present paper forms a coherent pattern. The first study found that people's rule inductions partially overlapped with those associated with the AI inductive learning program, INDUCE. The main strategies that emerged could be described in terms of a processing model, named Patch, that is inspired by INDUCE. According to the Patch model, two distinct types of opportunistic rules may appear. The main idea is that people set out to find descriptors that will span the target category without applying to examples from contrasting categories. If an assertion is consistent (covers no counterexamples) but not complete (does not span the target category), it is retained, and attention shifts to the members of the target category not covered by the original assertion. Then new assertions are sought that are consistent and complete for the reduced set (i.e., they form what we have referred to as an opportunistic disjunction). This is precisely how the main algorithm in INDUCE works. A second major possibility is that an assertion will be complete but not consistent. In this event, Patch assumes that people focus on the counter-examples and attempt to eliminate them by specializing their description, which can be done by negating properties that are true of the counterexamples but not for the positive examples (that is, they form what we have referred to as an opportunistic conjunction). In support of this interpretation, negations (e.g., not triangular) appear almost exclusively with conjunctive rules. The remaining studies were designed to evaluate further implications of the Patch model.

The second and third studies showed that people are far more likely to develop conjunctive rules with complete but not consistent descriptors than disjunctive rules with consistent but not complete descriptors. In addition, many rules derived by subjects contained redundant components. This observation is consistent with the Patch model and the idea that degree of "fit" to data and not just simplicity influences people's inductive generalizations. The fourth study used a learning procedure, and again component completeness (category validity) appeared to be more important than component consistency (cue validity). No participant gave a simple disjunctive rule. Instead, rules took one of three forms: (1) simple conjunctive, (2) disjunctive based on a consistent but not complete description supplemented by a description of the remaining example (e.g., "*short or long with a circular load*"), and (3) conjunctive based on a complete but not consistent descriptor supplemented with a description of the remaining counterexample. Again, a majority of the rule statements included more than the minimum

necessary descriptions. This pattern of results is consistent with the Patch model (and, by extension, with INDUCE).

Relation to AI Models

We have concentrated on the program INDUCE for reasons given in the introduction. As a psychological process model INDUCE fares rather well. Although it manifests a bias for conjunctive solutions it does allow for disjunctive solutions of the form we have been referring to as "opportunistic disjunctions." Its main shortcoming as a psychological model is that it does not contain an algorithm for "opportunistic conjunctions" where complete but not consistent rules are modified by negating properties of counterexamples.⁴ Although both types of opportunistic rules lack the elegance of a simple conjunctive description they do offer certain advantages. First of all, most concepts probably do not have singly necessary and jointly sufficient properties (see Medin & Smith, 1984, for a recent review) and, therefore, would allow for simple conjunctive rules. A second, related reason for considering allowing for opportunistic rules in AI programs is that it would allow for better immunity to noisy or partially inconsistent data. The first part of opportunistic rules would not be affected by a few inconsistencies or counterexamples.

Other AI programs fare less well as psychological models. In part, this is to be expected in that they were not intended to be models for human rule induction. The reasons why these alternative induction procedures do not mirror the human data are varied. First of all, some programs do not provide for constructive generalization rules (e.g., Mitchell, 1977). Although other programs employ constructive generalization rules (e.g., Winston, 1975; Hayes-Roth & McDermott, 1978) they contain no mechanisms for representing disjunctions. Most of the programs that do allow for disjunctions (e.g., Quinlan, 1975, 1979) assume that a discrimination net ordered by information value is developed to construct rules. These programs could not predict the strong preference for conjunctive rules and component category validity over disjunctive rules and component cue validity that was particularly salient in the second and third experiments. Finally, to our knowledge no AI program makes provision for the opportunistic conjunctions that were fairly prevalent in our human rule induction data.

Generality

The generality of the present results is certainly open to question. So far we have sampled from a small set of stimulus materials, procedures, and category structures. Yet to be determined is the extent to which we are studying

⁴ Vere (1980) and Winston (1983) have developed programs that deal with exceptions or counter examples. Also, refer again to footnote 3.

fairly general processing constraints as opposed to constraints associated with our particular tasks and stimulus materials. Even if we are sanguine with respect to general constraints, we know little about the range of flexibility available to people in rule induction tasks. As one approach to the issue of human flexibility, we have conducted followup work using a rule induction task and employing the trains from the first experiment. The main independent variable was that instead of labeling the trains as East- or Westbound, different labels and cover stories were presented. For example, a participant might be told that the categories were trains run by smugglers versus legal trains, or trains constructed by creative versus uncreative children, or trains that travel in mountainous versus flat terrains.

Our preliminary data suggest that these different labels influence rule inductions in systematic ways but these systemic changes are compatible with INDUCE and the Patch model. As one example of a change, the mountainous versus flat terrain labels make it much more likely that a participant will come up with the rule that the trains in one category have three or more different loads. In addition, certain salient properties that are readily linked to labels may lead participants to rules suggesting a greater bias toward consistency. For example, when the smuggler category included the train carrying a diamond-shaped load, a participant might give a rule of the form "diamond shaped load or..." even though the diamond descriptor applied to only a single load. Finally, for these more meaningful categories, we have some evidence that participants are more likely to tolerate rules which either are incomplete or have counter-examples.

Although one could probably demonstrate that a semantically-rich but syntactically-awkward rule will be preferred to a semantically-impoverished but syntactically-simple rule, such a demonstration is unlikely to constitute a powerful constraint on the generality of the present results. In most domains of interest semantic considerations may narrow down the set of properties which might enter into inductive generalizations but still leave an innumerable set of possible inductions. Among this set, syntactic considerations may play a powerful role. Of course, syntax and semantics may not be orthogonal. In novel domains, syntactic constraints may guide the search for semantically meaningful properties—a complete but not consistent descriptor is a good candidate for a necessary property and a consistent but not complete descriptor may turn out to be a sufficient property. (See Lebowitz, 1986, and Wattenmaker, Nakamura, & Medin, 1987, for a more extensive discussion of this issue.)

The Importance of Category Validity

Probably the most striking result was the emergence of category validity as a significant factor in rule inductions. The preference for conjunctive over disjunctive rules in the second and third studies may be seen as deriving

from an opportunistic combining of complete but not consistent descriptors. Again, we hasten to add that stating constraints in terms of products or outputs derives from the processing assumptions of the Patch model combined with the particular category structures employed. With different processing demands and alternative category structures the same processing model that continues to give an important role to category validity may give rise to a preponderance of disjunctive rather than conjunctive rules (e.g., Experiment 1).

There is still the question of whether these results on category validity have any significant generality. We think there are two strong reasons for thinking that they do. One is that our tasks are heavily biased toward discriminating rather than characterizing the categories and, therefore, heavily biased toward cue validity. Still, category validity emerged as a very significant factor and if that is true in the present circumstance, it ought to be even more true in the more general case where characterizing and understanding categories are more important. The second support for generality derives from some related research in diagnostic classification.

One domain that may be particularly relevant to the present studies is the diagnostic classification associated with medical problem solving. Some recent research in this area can be interpreted as supporting the importance of category validity. One fairly elaborate study by Fox (1980) employed a task where an initial symptom was presented and the person performing in the task could either make a diagnosis or perform tests for additional symptoms. Both the symptoms and diseases were realistic and the participants were third, fourth, and fifth year medical school students. All symptoms were associated with more than one disease and the probability of a symptom given a disease could and did vary from disease to disease. The medical students received extensive training on this task until their performance was asymptotic. Fox analyzed the sequential tests for symptoms in terms of a production system model and he did not directly consider the role of cue and category validity. There was one case, however, where the presenting symptom narrowed down the set of possible diseases to two and where some of the additional symptoms had the approximately same informative value but varied in category validity. Specifically, one symptom was associated with one disease half the time (probability of symptom/disease = .50) and never appeared with the other disease, whereas another symptom was associated with the first disease three-fourths of the time and appeared with the second one-fourth of the time. Because the diseases did not appear equally often the first symptom had a slightly greater information value but the second had a higher category validity. The results showed that the symptom with the higher category validity was tested for far more frequently than the other (33 out of 41 occasions). This suggests the influence of category validity is not confined to meaningless stimuli, short tasks, and naive subjects.

A related study with first-year house officers (Wolf, Gruppen, & Billi, 1985) also suggests the cue validity is not the sole factor determining diagnostic classification. Wolf et al. used a highly simplified task but one that tends to underline their results. The medical personnel were presented with cards labeled with two diseases (A and B) and two symptoms and given information about the prevalence of one of the symptoms in one of the disease categories. Participants were allowed to select one of the other three sources of information. To determine cue validity, one would need to test for the prevalence of the given symptom in the alternative disease category. Only a minority of the house officers (24%) consistently selected this optimal diagnostic information. Most of the nonoptimal choices were testing for the alternative symptom in the initial disease category. In general, if physicians organize their medical knowledge in terms of diseases and the likelihood that different symptoms are associated with them, then category validity may play a more important role in induction and diagnostic reasoning. Eddy's (1982) recent review of probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine showing that people often act as if cue validity is the same as category validity is consistent with this suggestion.

Relative emphases on cue versus category validity have different implications for which procedural variations should optimize learning. Consider a classification learning task involving two categories where in the initial phases of learning the examples from alternative categories are either randomly intermixed or blocked by category (i.e., all the examples of one category appear before the examples of the other category). To determine cue validity, one needs to have a contrast category so mixing examples should facilitate learning. On the other hand, acquiring information about category validities ought to be facilitated when examples are blocked by categories. The evidence indicates that learning is considerably more efficient under blocked rather than mixed presentation for both rule-based (Whitman & Garner, 1963) and fuzzy categories (Murphy, 1984).

The present findings, along with results from the studies just reviewed, undermine the idea that people classify and form inductive generalizations by computing cue validity or information value and then developing something like a discrimination net model. On the other hand, cue validity is not totally ignored. For example, although the rules given for the trains in Experiment 2 were often redundant, they did not include properties that were true of all members of both categories (i.e., those with zero cue validity). In addition, one might readily imagine that rule redundancy could readily be decreased (or increased) by different instructions or task demands. The results do suggest, however, that category validity plays a more significant role than implied by previous accounts of rule induction. Given that this pattern of results apparently holds for medical diagnosis and classification learning, where the emphasis is on discrimination, it ought to be even more

powerful for natural object categories where the emphasis is often on the inferences which can be derived from knowledge of category membership. (See Gelman, 1987, for evidence that category membership guides inductive inferences in even young children.)

Implications for Constraints

The models we have been discussing suggest some fairly general biases or constraints on rule inductions. If we take as our starting point the vague notion that the only constraint needed is that people prefer simple rules to complex rules, then we can claim considerable progress. First of all, simplicity is not the whole story. Whether we define simplicity in terms of number of operators or complexity of descriptors, our experiments demonstrate inductive generalizations are influenced by factors other than simplicity. People show strong preferences among equally simple rules and their rules very frequently contain more than the minimal content needed to discriminate between the categories. And it is not the case that this lack of parsimony arises from people's failures to discover simple rules. In a large number of cases people stated rules that could be made more simple by dropping conditions. These and other observations support the idea that people's inductions are also influenced by the concept of *fit* or degree of specificity. The concept of fit implies that rule inductions may tend toward greater specificity than the most simple and general discriminating rules. One could think of this emphasis on fit as protecting the system from drawing generalizations that are too broad and difficult to recover from (see Berwick, 1986). Also, the fit biases descriptions toward including the maximum number of correlated descriptors in one conjunctive statement. This bias toward correlated attributes allows for convenient representation of inferences which may be drawn from category membership and may set the stage for causal linkages among descriptors (see Wattenmaker, et al., 1987).

The Patch model also embodies other constraints. According to this model, one cannot specify independent of particular structures whether conjunctive or disjunctive rules are more likely to predominate. It is the case, however, that processes such as initially searching for completeness and then modifying descriptions to insure consistency will provide powerful biases in rule inductions and allow one to make predictions about the relative preponderance of disjunctive and conjunctive rules for any particular structure. That is, *the constraints are embodied in the process model for performance and not in some abstract statement of the general difficulty of different types of rules.*

The notion that constraints are embodied in process models suggests a future direction of research. For example, the difference in rule statement between the second and third studies versus the fourth study shows that

demands on memory associated with learning procedures provides an additional source of constraints. A more detailed model for human rule induction that included a limited working memory would provide a framework for exploring additional constraints on human rule induction.

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